Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats

Audrey Hu () and Liang Zhou ()
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Audrey Hu: Universiteit van Amsterdam
Liang Zhou: Universiteit van Amsterdam

No 07-096/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.

Keywords: rent seeking; corruption; selection of officials; quasi-auction; sale of jobs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D73 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20070096

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