High-Speed Rail & Air Transport Competition

Nicole Adler (), Chris Nash and Eric Pels ()
Additional contact information
Nicole Adler: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Chris Nash: Institute for Transport Studies, Leeds, England
Eric Pels: VU University Amsterdam

No 08-103/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper develops a methodology to assess transport infrastructure investments and their effects on a Nash equilibria taking into account competition between multiple privatized transport operator types. The operators, including high-speed rail, hub and spoke legacy airlines and low cost carriers, maximize profit functions via prices, frequency and train/plane sizes, given infrastructure provision and costs and environmental charges. The methodology is subsequently applied to all 27 European Union countries, specifically analyzing four of the prioritized Trans-European Networks.

This discussion paper led to an article in Transportation Research B (2010). Volume 44, pages 812-833.

Keywords: airlines; high-speed rail; networks; applied game theory; infrastructure pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L92 L93 R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20080103

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