Employment Protection, Technology Choice, and Worker Allocation

Eric Bartelsman, Pieter Gautier and Joris de Wind
Additional contact information
Joris de Wind: De Nederlandsche Bank, University of Amsterdam

No 10-042/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Using a country-industry panel dataset (EUKLEMS) we uncover a robust empirical regularity, namely that high-risk innovative sectors are relatively smaller in countries with strict employment protection legislation (EPL). To understand the mechanism, we develop a two-sector matching model where firms endogenously choose between a safe technology with known productivity and a risky technology with productivity subject to sizeable shocks. Strict EPL makes the risky technology relatively less attractive because it is more costly to shed workers upon receiving a low productivity draw. We calibrate the model using a variety of aggregate, industry and micro-level data sources. We then simulate the model to reflect both the observed differences across countries in EPL and the observed increase since the mid-1990s in the variance of firm performance associated with the adoption of information and communication technology. The simulations produce a differential response to the arrival of risky technology between low- and high-EPL countries that coincides with the findings in the data. The described mechanism can explain a considerable portion of the slowdown in productivity in the EU relative to the US since 1995.

Keywords: employment protection legislation; exit costs; Information and Communications Technology; heterogeneous productivity; sectoral allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J65 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-04-19
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/10042.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION, TECHNOLOGY CHOICE, AND WORKER ALLOCATION (2016)
Working Paper: Employment Protection, Technology Choice, and Worker Allocation (2010)
Working Paper: Employment Protection, Technology Choice, and Worker Allocation (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100042

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().