The (Hidden) Cost of Employer Parking Policies

Jos van Ommeren () and Derk Wentink
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Derk Wentink: VU University Amsterdam

No 10-048/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'International Economic Review' , 53(3), 965-978.

It has been argued that urban planning policies, through minimum parking requirements, and income tax policies induce free employer parking. We show that tax policies induce welfare losses in the order of 12% of parking resource costs, implying an annual deadweight loss in the order of € 5 billion for Europe. In the US, due to the presence of minimum parking requirements, the deadweight loss of policy is even higher and in the order of $ 30 billion.

Keywords: employer parking; tax distortion; urban planning policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: THE (HIDDEN) COST OF EMPLOYER PARKING POLICIES (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100048

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