Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment
Tomaso Duso (),
Lars-Hendrik Roeller and
Jo Seldeslachts ()
Additional contact information
Lars-Hendrik Roeller: European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) and Humboldt University Berlin
No 10-112/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors -created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time- are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing.
Keywords: Research Joint Ventures; Innovation; Collusion; NCRA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L24 L44 D22 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Collusion Through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment (2014)
Working Paper: Collusion through joint R&D: An empirical assessment (2012)
Working Paper: Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100112
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().