Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

Tomaso Duso, Lars-Hendrik Roeller and Jo Seldeslachts
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Lars-Hendrik Roeller: European School of Management and Technology (ESMT) and Humboldt University Berlin

No 10-112/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors -created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time- are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing.

Keywords: Research Joint Ventures; Innovation; Collusion; NCRA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 K21 L24 L44 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Collusion Through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment (2014)
Working Paper: Collusion through joint R&D: An empirical assessment (2012)
Working Paper: Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100112

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