On the Role of Pre-Determined Rules for HRM Policies

Silvia Dominguez-Martinez () and Otto Swank ()

No 11-034/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to differentiate between employees on the basis of their abilities, and (2) to terminate employment of employees on probation. Generally, organizations benefit from committing to strict rules for various HRM practices.

Keywords: rules; human resource management policies; self-image; motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110034

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