Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?

Zara Sharif and Otto Swank ()
Additional contact information
Zara Sharif: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 12-134/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher probability. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information.

Keywords: information collection; communication; interest groups; decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 H39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12134.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120134

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().