The Political Economy of Finance

Enrico Perotti

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Capitalism and Society' , 2014, 9(1), Article 1.

This survey reviews how a recent political economy literature helps explaining variation in governance, competition, funding composition and access to credit. Evolution in political institutions can account for financial evolution, and appear critical to explain rapid changes in financial structure, such as the Great Reversal in the early XX century, unlike time-invariant legal institutions or cultural traits. Future research should model the sources and consequences of financial instability, and to predict how major redistributive shocks will shape regulatory choices and financial governance.

Keywords: political institutions; property rights; investor protection; financial development; access to finance; entry; banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 G32 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130034

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