The Economics of First-Contract Mediation

Sabien Dobbelaere and Roland Iwan Luttens
Additional contact information
Roland Iwan Luttens: VU University Amsterdam, and Amsterdam University College, the Netherlands

No 13-096/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto efficient and proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. We also demonstrate that equilibrium wages and profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.

Keywords: BC first-contract model; mediation; collective bargaining; union; non-binding contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 J51 K12 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/13096.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Economics of First-Contract Mediation (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130096

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().