International Environmental Agreements with Support

Erik Ansink, Hans-Peter Weikard and Cees Withagen

No 15-015/VIII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Public goods; Support; Transfers; International Environmental Agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01-27, Revised 2017-07-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: International environmental agreements with support (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150015

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