Note on ‘Competition in Two-sided Markets’

Yuyu Zeng, Harold Houba and Gerard van der Laan
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Yuyu Zeng: VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Harold Houba: VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands

No 15-080/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We extend the models in ("Competition in two-sided markets" of Armstrong (2006, Rand Journal of Economics ) by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price effect. In the case of a competitive bottleneck, we show by examples that within a certain range of parameter values, a novel phenomenon arises that the platform attracts more agents from one of the groups compared with the social optimum.

Keywords: Competition economics; two-sided market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150080

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