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On the 1-Nucleolus for Classes of Cooperative Games

A. Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, M.A. Mosquera and E. Sánchez-Rodríguez
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A. Estévez-Fernández: VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo, Spain
M.A. Mosquera: Universidade de Vigo, Spain
E. Sánchez-Rodríguez: Universidade de Vigo, Spain

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arantza Estévez Fernández

No 15-123/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any zero-normalized balanced game, the 1-nucleolus coincides with the Aumann-Maschler rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985} in this sense. From this result, not only necessary conditions on a compromise stable game are derived such that the 1-nucleolus and the nucleolus coincide, but also necessary and sufficient conditions such that the 1-nucleolus and the compromise value of exact games coincide.

Keywords: 1-nucleolus; Compromise stable games; Exact games; Aumann-Maschler rule; Nucleolus; Compromise value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150123

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