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Interval Solutions for Tu-games

Rene (J.R.) van den Brink (), Osman Palanci () and S. Zeynep Alparslan Gok ()
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Rene (J.R.) van den Brink: VU Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands
Osman Palanci: Suleyman Demirel University, Isparta, Turkey
S. Zeynep Alparslan Gok: Suleyman Demirel University, Isparta, Turkey

No 17-094/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Standard solutions for TU-games assign to every TU-game a payoff vector. However, if there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation then we cannot just assign a specific payoff to every player. Therefore, in this paper we introduce interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every TU-game a vector of payoff intervals. Since the solution we propose uses marginal vectors of the interval game, we need to apply a difference operator on intervals. Applying the subtraction operator of Moore (1979), we define an interval solution for TU-games, and we provide an axiomatization.

Keywords: Cooperative TU-game; interval game; Moore subtraction; Moore-Shapley interval solution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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