Contingent Convertibles: Can the Market Handle them?
Gera Kiewiet (),
Iman Lelyveld and
Sweder van Wijnbergen ()
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Gera Kiewiet: DNB. The Netherlands
No 17-095/VI, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
The recent financial crisis has led to the introduction of contingent convertible instruments (CoCos) in the capital framework for banks. Although CoCos can provide benefits, such as automatic recapitalization of troubled banks, their inherent risks raise questions about whether they increase the safety of the banking system. We show that concerns about CoCos in just a single bank can result in the decline of an entire market, with investors apparently unable to distinguish safe from risky bonds. In times of market-panic, investors tend to rely on credit ratings instead of estimating the real risks of missing coupon payments. We provide several recommendations to improve the capital requirements regime for banks.
Keywords: Contagion; Contingent Convertible Capital; Systemic Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G21 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cfn
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Working Paper: Contingent Convertibles: Can the Market handle them? (2017)
Working Paper: Contingent convertibles: Can the market handle them? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170095
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