"I" on You: Identity in the Dictator Game
Anita Kopányi-Peuker and
Jin Di Zheng
No 19-049/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
Abstract:
We study a giver’s generosity depending on her relationship with the recipient and the observer. We assign different group identities to the players using a variation of the minimumgroup paradigm, and test the effect of group memberships on altruistic giving in the dictator game with a passive observer. The results show that the dictator gives the least when she is from a different group than the other two. We further show that dictators give more when there is no observer. This is driven by male subjects who react more to the presence of the observer.
Keywords: dictator game; observer; group identity; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-07-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/19049.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190049
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().