Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures
Harold Houba and
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Yukihiko Funaki: Waseda University
Harold Houba: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
No 19-070/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
We develop a novel model of price-fee competition in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures and costly transportation. The model captures a variety of real market situations and it is the continuous quantity version of the assignment game with indivisible goods on a fixed network. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they achieve maximal bilateral joint welfare at prices equal to marginal costs. Maximal fees and the suppliers' market power are restricted by the buyers' credible threats to switch suppliers. Maximal fees also arise from a negotiation model that extends price competition to price-fee competition. Competition in both prices and fees necessarily emerges. It improves welfare compared to price competition, but buyers will not be better off. The minimal infrastructure achieving maximal aggregate welfare differs from the minimal network that protects buyers most.
Keywords: Assignment Games; Infrastructure; Non-linear pricing; Market Power; Negotiations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 C78 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-reg and nep-tre
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Working Paper: Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpandable Infrastructures (2012)
Working Paper: Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly Markets with Nonexpendable Infrastructure (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190070
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