Sharing the Surplus and Proportional Values

Zhengxing Zou and Rene van den Brink
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Rene van den Brink: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 20-014/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value ï¬ rst assigns to each player a compromise between his stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value in this family.

Keywords: Cooperative game; proportional value; surplus sharing; axiomatization; balanced contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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