Equal Loss under Separatorization and Egalitarian Values

Zhengxing Zou and Rene van den Brink
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Rene van den Brink: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 20-043/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We characterize the equal division value, the equal surplus division value, and the class of their ane combinations for TU-games involving equal loss under separatorization. This axiom requires that, if a player becomes a dummifying player (Casajus and Huettner, in Economics Letters 122(2): 167-169, 2014), then any two other players are equally affected.

Keywords: Cooperative game; equal division value; equal surplus division value; axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Equal loss under separatorization and egalitarian values (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20200043

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