Market power in California's water market

Françeska Tomori, Erik Ansink, Harold Houba, Nick Hagerty and Charles Bos
Additional contact information
Nick Hagerty: Montana State University

No 21-011/VIII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We estimate market power in California's thin water market. Market frictions may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a typical water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.

Keywords: Water markets; Market power; California; Cournot-Nash (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/21011.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Market power in California's water market (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20210011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().