Weighting the Waiting: Intertemporal Social Preferences

Kirsten I.M. Rohde, Job van Exel and Merel A.J. van Hulsen
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Kirsten I.M. Rohde: Erasmus University Rotterdam and Maastricht University
Merel A.J. van Hulsen: Erasmus University Rotterdam

No 22-023/I, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper studies intertemporal social preferences. We introduce intertemporal dictator and ultimatum games where players decide on the timing of monetary payoffs. The setting is two- dimensional: inequalities can arise in the time as well as in the monetary dimension. The results of our experiment show that decisions on the distribution of the timing of payoffs depend on inequalities in the sizes of these payoffs in a systematic way in intertemporal ultimatum games, but much less so in intertemporal dictator games. Surprisingly, we found positive correlation between decisions only in some intertemporal games and regular games, and no correlation with time preferences. All in all our results cannot be explained by an intertemporal social preference model that assumes utility to be a simple weighted sum of discounted utilities of players. Our results rather suggest that the weight given to the discounted utility of a player depends on the inequality in discounted utilities. Hence, this paper calls for the development of new models of intertemporal social preferences.

Keywords: Intertemporal social preferences; social preferences; time preferences; dictator game; ultimatum game; multidimensional inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03-01, Revised 2024-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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