Identifying Risk-based Selection in Social Insurance: New Approaches and Findings
Mette EjrnÃ¦s and
Additional contact information
Mette EjrnÃ¦s: University of Copenhagen
Stefan Hochguertel: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
No 22-040/V, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
We study risk-based selection into a voluntary unemployment insurance (UI) scheme. To disentangle behavioral effects from selection, we exploit variation in the sign-up induced by an early retirement scheme embedded into the UI system. We combine an event study with a difference-in-difference approach applied to Danish register data to quantify the selection. We find that individuals who sign up for UI are negatively selected in terms of subsequent unemployment. However, we find important heterogeneity across education and gender. In addition, life cycle events (such as buying a first home) point to effects consistent with dynamic selection on moral hazard.
Keywords: Unemployment; insurance; selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220040
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().