Construction of Compromise Values for Cooperative Games

Robert P. Gilles and Rene van den Brink
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Robert P. Gilles: The Queen's University of Belfast
Rene van den Brink: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute

No 25-017/II, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as compromise values. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs. We identify subclasses of games that admit non-trivial efficient allocations within the considered bounds, which we call bound-balanced games. Subsequently, we define the associated compromise value. We also provide an axiomatisation of this class of compromise values using a combination of the minimal-rights property and a variant of restricted proportionality. We construct and axiomatise various well-known and new compromise values based on these methods, including the ð œ -, the 𠜒-, the Gately, the CIS-, the PANSC-, the EANSC- and the new KM-values. We conclude that this approach establishes a common foundation for a wide range of different values.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03-14
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