School choice, school switching, and optimal assignment

Hessel Oosterbeek, Tina Rozsos and Bas van der Klaauw
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Hessel Oosterbeek: University of Amsterdam
Tina Rozsos: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Bas van der Klaauw: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 25-066/V, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Close to 20% of secondary school students in Amsterdam - and elsewhere - transfer between secondary schools at some point, even when initially placed in their most-preferred school. School switching is costly for the students involved and disrupts the learning environment of their former and new classmates. Using data from the Amsterdam secondary-school match linked to administrative registers, we show that switching can be predicted by hard-to-rationalize initial school choices. Over 60% of switchers can be correctly identified at the admission stage. Simulations indicate that encouraging predicted switchers to adjust their preference ranking of schools could reduce the switching rate by almost 15%.

Keywords: secondary education; school choice; school switching; admission lottery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 C53 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-11-27
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