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Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis

James Albrecht () and Jan van Ours ()

No 2001-49, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: This paper presents a test of the educational signaling hypothesis.If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants.We nd that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

Keywords: education; labour demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis* (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001) Downloads
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