Is Leverage Effective in Increasing Performance Under Managerial Moral Hazard?

R. Calcagno
Additional contact information
R. Calcagno: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 2000-101, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: corporate performance; management; moral hazard; capital structure; incentives; agency theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstream ... d7a6cc5022c/download (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiucen:119da195-15e9-4467-a51b-c361ca2152e7

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard Broekman ().