Ranking Terrorists in Networks: A Sensitivity Analysis of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 Attack

B.G.M. Husslage, Peter Borm, T. Burg, H.J.M. Hamers and R. Lindelauf
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B.G.M. Husslage: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
H.J.M. Hamers: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 2014-028, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: terrorism; Network Analysis; Centrality measures; Cooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ict and nep-net
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Working Paper: Ranking Terrorists in Networks: A Sensitivity Analysis of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 Attack (2014)
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