International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

Kim Hang Pham Do and Henk Folmer ()

No 2003-52, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: international fisheries; overexploitation; partial cooperation; games in partition function form; competitive equilibrium; modified Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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