Shareholder Lock-In Contracts: Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry

P.P. Angenandt, Marc Goergen and Luc Renneboog

No 2005-115, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: shareholders; venture capital; lock-in agreements; lock-up contracts; lock-in expiry; lock-up expiry; signaling; underwriter reputation; underpricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Shareholder Lock-In Contracts: Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry (2005)
Working Paper: Shareholder Lock-In Contracts: Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry (2005)
Working Paper: Shareholder Lock-In Contracts: Share Price and Trading Volume Effects at the Lock-In Expiry (2005)
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