An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism: Imperfect Information without Common Priors

M. Khanman, Motty Perry and Philip Reny ()
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M. Khanman: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 1996-24, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Date: 1996
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Working Paper: An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism: Imperfect Information without Common Priors (1996)
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