Sequential Common Agency

Andrea Prat and A. Rustichini
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A. Rustichini: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 1998-95, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: Common agency; sequential games; principal agent games; political influence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Sequential Common Agency (1998)
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