Determination of Optimal Penalties for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting

Evgenia Motchenkova

No 2004-96, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: antitrust; policy; law; dynamic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Related works:
Journal Article: Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting (2008)
Working Paper: Determination of Optimal Penalities for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting (2004)
Working Paper: Determination of Optimal Penalties for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting (2004)
Working Paper: Determination of Optimal Penalities for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting (2004)
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