On Cleaner Technologies in a Transboundary Pollution Game
Hassan Benchekroun () and
Amrita Ray Chaudhuri ()
No 2009-23, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
We show that in a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, a cleaner technology (i.e., a decrease in the emission to output ratio) induces each country to increase its emissions and ultimately can yield a higher level of pollution and reduce social welfare.
Keywords: transboundary pollution; technological innovation; differential game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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