Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements
Hassan Benchekroun (),
Walid Marrouch () and
Amrita Ray Chaudhuri ()
No 2011-120, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
While an international agreement over the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions proves to be elusive, there is a large and growing support for investment in developing more effective technologies to adapt to climate change. We show that an increase in effectiveness of adaptation will diminish the incentive of individual countries to free-ride on a global agreement over emissions. Moreover, we show that this positive effect of an increase in adaptation's effectiveness can also be accompanied by an increase in the gains from global cooperation over GHGs emissions.
Keywords: adaptation; climate change; international environmental agreements; transboundary pollution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q54 Q59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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