Games with imperfectly observable commitment
Eric van Damme and
No 1994-64, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Keywords: Game; Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment (1997)
Working Paper: Games with imperfectly observable commitment (1997)
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