The Procedural Egalitarian Solution and Egalitarian Stable Games
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Bas Dietzenbacher: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
No 2019-007, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
This paper studies the procedural egalitarian solution on the class of egalitarian stable games. By deriving several axiomatic characterizations involving consistency and monotonicity, we show that the procedural egalitarian solution satisfies various desirable properties and unites many egalitarian concepts defined in the literature. Moreover, we illustrate the computational implications of these characterizations and relate the class of egalitarian stable games to other well-known classes.
Keywords: egalitarianism; transferable utility games; procedural egalitarian solution; egalitarian stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiucen:6caea8c0-1dcd-4038-88da-bbf034bd65b6
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