'Be Nice Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy

Jan Boone

No 2002-23, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: game theory; mergers; Nash equilibrium; price competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstream ... 04f75a74161/download (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: 'Be nice, unless it pays to fight': A new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy (2003)
Working Paper: 'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy (2002)
Working Paper: ’Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiucen:739723a0-ffec-49c9-bef8-712e2fd6385f

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard Broekman ().