Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by the Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

G. Pawlina and Luc Renneboog
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G. Pawlina: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 2005-23, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: investment-cash flow sensitivity; ownership and control; asymmetric information; liquidity constraints; agency costs of free cash flow; large shareholder monitoring; Shapley values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (82)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK (2005)
Working Paper: Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by the Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK (2005)
Working Paper: Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by the Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK (2005)
Working Paper: Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by the Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK (2005)
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