Hypercubes and Compromise Values for Cooperative Fuzzy Games

R. Brânzei, Dinko Dimitrov and S.H. Tijs
Additional contact information
R. Brânzei: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
S.H. Tijs: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 2002-14, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: cooperative games; Compromise values; Core; Fuzzy coalitions; Fuzzy games; Hypercubes; Path solutions; Weber set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstream ... ca61c4ff298/download (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games (2017)
Journal Article: Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games (2004)
Working Paper: Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games (2004)
Working Paper: Hypercubes and Compromise Values for Cooperative Fuzzy Games (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiucen:8633fb45-08eb-48e3-80d5-e3dae2c305d4

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard Broekman ().