Equilibrium selection in team games
Eric van Damme
No 1995-125, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
It is shown that in team games, i.e. in games in which all players have the same payoff function, the risk-dominant equilibrium may differ from the Pareto dominant one.
Keywords: game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Equilibrium selection in team games (1996)
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