Optimal Environmental Standards under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Enforcement

Carmen Arguedas

No 2005-10, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: standard-setting; costly inspections; convex fines; asymmetric information; noncompliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Optimal Environmental Standards under Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Enforcement (2005)
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