Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data

Jaap Abbring, P.A. Chiappori and Tibor Zavadil

No 2008-77, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: insurance; moral hazard; selection; state dependence; event-history analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Working Paper: Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data (2008)
Working Paper: Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data (2008)
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