Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form

E. Fukuda, S.H. Tijs, R. Brânzei and S. Muto
Additional contact information
S.H. Tijs: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
R. Brânzei: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 2002-117, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstream ... b8fb9c9a6c1/download (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiucen:9374032a-efac-43dd-a3db-785b3163ff05

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard Broekman ().