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Strategic Equilibrium

Eric van Damme

No 2000-115, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Abstract: An outcome in a noncooperative game is said to be self-enforcing, or a strategic equilibrium, if, whenever it is recommended to the players, no player has an incentive to deviate from it.This paper gives an overview of the concepts that have been proposed as formalizations of this requirement and of the properties and the applications of these concepts.In particular the paper discusses Nash equilibrium, together with its main coarsenings (correlated equilibrium, rationalizibility) and its main refinements (sequential, perfect, proper, persistent and stable equilibria).There is also an extensive discussion on equilibrium selection.

Keywords: noncooperative games; equilibrium analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Chapter: Strategic equilibrium (2002) Downloads
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