The Nucleolus and Inheritance of Properties in Communication Situations
Bas Dietzenbacher and
Peter Borm ()
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Jop Schouten: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
Bas Dietzenbacher: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
No 2019-008, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
This paper studies the nucleolus of graph-restricted games as an alternative for the Shapley value to evaluate communication situations. We focus on the inheritance of properties of cooperative games related to the nucleolus: balancedness (the nucleolus is in the core), compromise stability and strong compromise admissibility (these properties allow for a direct, closed formula for the nucleolus). We characterize the families of graphs for which the graph-restricted games inherit these properties from the underlying games. Moreover, for each of these properties, we characterize the family of graphs for which the nucleolus is invariant.
Keywords: nucleolus; communication situations; graph-restricted game; inheritance of properties; compormise stability; strong compromise admissibility; invariance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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