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Gyula Seres
No 201-012, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Keywords: monopoly; commitment; Information asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers) Date: 2019 New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Citations:
Downloads: (external link)https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstream ... cc0d4f8da69/download (application/pdf)
Related works:Journal Article: Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly (2024) Working Paper: Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly (2019) Working Paper: Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly (2019) Working Paper: Uncertain Commitment Power in a Durable Good Monopoly (2019) This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
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