Optimal commitment in an open economy: Credibility vs. flexibility

Sylvester Eijffinger and Eric Schaling ()

No 1995-79, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: Central Banks; Credibility; Independence; monetary economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstream ... 157155e8f37/download (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal commitment in an open economy: Credibility vs. flexibility (1997)
Working Paper: Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy: Credibility vs. Flexibility (1995)
Working Paper: Optimal commitment in an open economy: Credibility vs. flexibility (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tiu:tiucen:d6bf01ec-595f-43ad-a0b7-9fcfb4d66aeb

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Richard Broekman ().