Cartel Formation under Incomplete Information: on the Requirements of Collusion-Proofness

Jerome Pouyet and Vincent Verouden ()

No 2000-01, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: cartel formation; asymmetric information; subcoalitions; collusion-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Cartel Formation under Incomplete Information: on the Requirements of Collusion-Proofness (2000)
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