A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects

Arantza Estévez Fernández

No 2008-84, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: Project planning; delay; expedition; cost sharing mechanism; surplus sharing mechanism; bankruptcy problems; taxation problems; cooperative game; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Journal Article: A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects (2012)
Working Paper: A Game Theoretical Approach to Sharing Penalties and Rewards in Projects (2009)
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