Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games

A. Khmelnitskaya, Gerard van der Laan and Adolphus Talman

No 2016-035, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: cooperative game; Shapley value; communication graph; restricted cooperation; Centrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games (2016)
Working Paper: Centrality Rewarding Shapley and Myerson Values for Undirected Graph Games (2016)
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