Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device

Lans Bovenberg and C. N. Teulings ()

No 2002-36, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: information; labour; insurance; moral hazard; contracts; principal agent theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device (2002)
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